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Hegel’s Concept of Desire
S C o t t  J e n k i n S
there is a longstanding tendency in philosophy, and in some pre-theoretical 
contexts, to regard persons as essentially disembodied points of view on the world. 
in the thought of figures as diverse as Plato, Descartes, and thomas nagel, this 
tendency results in the division of a person, with features of our conscious lives 
such as bodily awareness, the feeling of desire, or the relation to other persons 
relegated to inessential status. in what follows i propose one way of understanding 
some early developments in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit that involves attributing 
to Hegel a concern with denying that these aspects of human experience may be 
sorted in this manner.
My exposition of Hegel’s position focuses on his concept of desire, which 
figures most prominently in his assertion at the beginning of the fourth chapter 
that “self-consciousness is desire in general” (¶167).1 there are almost as many 
understandings of this assertion as there are interpretations of the Phenomenology, 
but i believe the reading i offer to be novel. i propose that we understand Hegel’s 
identification of self-consciousness and desire as the claim that desiring plays an 
important role in an apperceptive subject’s relation to itself. in arguing for this 
reading, i demonstrate that there exist deep affinities between Hegel’s remarks 
on self-consciousness and desire in the Phenomenology and Fichte’s treatment of 
these topics in his applied philosophy during the Jena period, in particular in his 
System of Ethics.2 Understood in this way, Hegel’s concept of desire figures in an 
ambitious attempt to establish relations of interdependence between subjective 
capacities regarded as essential to consciousness and those often relegated to 
inessential status.
Scott Jenkins is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of kansas.
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit [Phenomenology], trans. A.V. Miller (oxford: 
oxford University Press, 1977). References to the Phenomenology of Spirit are to Miller’s translation and 
will be made within the text using the paragraph numbers in Miller, while all other references will 
be made in notes. i have also made use of Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 1952).
2 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The System of Ethics, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale and Günter Zöller 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). References are to this edition and Sämmtliche Werke 
[SW], ed. immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971). i have also made use of 
Fichte, Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1995).
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i begin in the first two sections with an examination of Hegel’s concept of desire 
itself and understandings of this concept in the work of John McDowell, Robert 
Pippin, and terry Pinkard. i argue in section one that one strategy for interpreting 
Hegel’s remarks on desire, what i term the “contextual” reading, fails as a read-
ing of the text. in section two i examine the relations between Hegel’s concepts 
of desire, life, and self-consciousness, eventually arriving at a more adequate 
understanding of the concept of desire. in these sections, i aim to abstract from 
the question of how desire emerges from the dialectic of the first three chapters 
of the Phenomenology in order to focus on Hegel’s actual use of the concept in 
“Self-Consciousness.” While this approach to the text certainly violates the spirit 
of Hegel’s methodological commitment to constructing each stage in the develop-
ment of the Phenomenology from those that precede it, i believe that worries about 
the “necessity” of transitions in the work, as well as obscurities associated with this 
particular transition, warrant this approach to Hegel’s discussion of desire.
in section three, i explain how desire, understood as a determination of a liv-
ing being, can play a role in an explanation of self-consciousness that is neither 
genetic nor foundational. Hegel’s construction of such an explanation of self-
consciousness in the Phenomenology, i argue, constitutes one of his most important 
inheritances from Fichte. Section four places Hegel’s views on the relation of desire 
to self-consciousness within the broader context of the opening chapters of the 
Phenomenology. Here i show how Hegel’s employment of the concept of desire can be 
regarded as part of a larger concern with demonstrating the interrelation between 
apparently unconnected subjective capacities. in addition, i argue that desire plays 
a surprising role in Hegel’s account of the reality of objects of cognition. 
two preliminary points are worth noting here. First, i will have relatively little 
to say about the other obviously Fichtean element in Hegel’s account of self-
consciousness: the concept of recognition. With the exception of a few remarks in 
section four, my discussion of desire in Hegel will simply take for granted a rough 
understanding of recognition that is, i believe, uncontroversial. this is not because 
i find the notion of recognition to be unimportant in Hegel’s thought. on the 
contrary, i take recognition and desire to be equally essential to his account of self-
consciousness. A more complete account of Hegel’s views on self-consciousness 
and subjectivity would obviously need to examine the relation between desire, 
recognition, and intersubjectivity.
Second, while the reading of Hegel that i propose here is quite Fichtean, i do 
not mean to suggest that Hegel intended the early chapters of the Phenomenology 
as an appraisal of Fichte, or that he had in mind the particular passages from 
Fichte’s works that i discuss. However, i do believe that reading Hegel through 
Fichte has the benefit of making certain themes in Hegel clearer than they would 
otherwise be. it is often the case that Hegel’s concerns in the Phenomenology be-
come clear only against the background of his understanding of his predecessors. 
And while i believe that this is especially so in the case of Hegel’s identification of 
self-consciousness and desire, the reading of this identification that i propose also 
receives considerable support from the text of the Phenomenology itself.
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1 .  t h e  c o n t e x t u a l  r e a d i n g  o f  d e s i r e
if we read Hegel’s claim that self-consciousness is desire as applying to conscious-
ness in general, then we must treat this identification as a claim about the kind 
of things we all are—a claim about rational, sentient beings.3 that is the reading 
of Hegel that i will pursue beginning in section two, but Hegel’s introduction of 
desire in ¶167 suggests an alternate reading of this identification, one that does 
not entail any conclusions concerning consciousness in general. if we take the 
term ‘self-consciousness’ to refer primarily to a particular stage in the develop-
ment of the observed consciousness in the Phenomenology, then the identification of 
self-consciousness and desire becomes a claim about the observed consciousness 
at this point in the dialectic, namely, upon its realization that the object of cognition 
is essentially an object for consciousness, determined by its capacities for cogni-
tion.4 Hegel would be telling us that in virtue of having reached the end of the 
reflection found in the first three chapters of the Phenomenology, the “protagonist” 
of the work now finds itself as desire. And it would be natural to understand such 
desire as a desire for some particular state of affairs.
Hegel can be read as suggesting such an understanding of this identification in 
his discussion of the two moments of consciousness, one in which consciousness 
relates to objects as independent and essentially other (the point of view of the first 
three chapters of the work), and one in which consciousness sees this difference 
between itself and its objects as one without being (der an sich kein Sein hat) (¶167). 
these two moments of consciousness are prima facie incompatible. one and the 
same subject, it would seem, cannot relate to objects both as independent and as 
nothing more than appearances for it. But the observed consciousness has by this 
point in the Phenomenology discovered that these two points of view are essential to 
it, insofar as the realist standpoint of the first three chapters—the point of view 
of natural consciousness that no one can abandon for any significant length of 
time—has as its condition an implicit self-relation in any relation to an object.5 
this revelation might be regarded as motivating the task of constructing a self-
conception that enables the observed consciousness to see these two moments of 
consciousness as compatible.
if such a self-conception is what consciousness needs at this point, it is tempt-
ing to regard Hegel’s identification of self-consciousness and desire as a partial 
description of the problem that confronts the observed consciousness here. this is 
3 in what follows i abstract from Hegel’s use of the term ‘in general’ (überhaupt) to characterize 
desire in the assertion “self-consciousness is desire in general” (¶167). on my reading of Hegel, the 
need for this qualification becomes evident only later in the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology. i 
return to this point in section four.
4 By ‘the observed consciousness’ i mean the subject of the various experiences in the Phenomenology, 
such as the experience of discovering that some conception of knowledge or its object is inadequate. 
this figure is the observed consciousness insofar as we, the readers of the Phenomenology, are to consider 
the significance of its experiences and order those experiences in such a way that they constitute a 
single course of reflection. See ¶¶86–87.
5 Hegel states that the realist standpoint of consciousness, for which the “whole expanse of the 
sensual world” is preserved, exists “only as connected” with the second moment of consciousness, 
namely self-consciousness (¶167). By this he means that while this realist standpoint is conditioned, 
it is not cancelled or abandoned in the transition from “Consciousness” to “Self-Consciousness.”
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John McDowell’s view, according to which desire enters the picture as a preliminary 
characterization of the attitude of the observed consciousness qua self-conscious-
ness—the second moment in Hegel’s “two moments” formulation—toward the 
first moment of consciousness. the latter is the object of desire since it is what 
must be incorporated into the subject that finds itself as self-consciousness if that 
subject is to possess a stable self-conception. our understanding of exactly what 
this desirous Aufhebung or “sublation” involves for Hegel—the annihilation of the 
other moment, its incorporation and preservation, or something else—would 
then depend on a prior understanding of the two-moments problem, not on some 
independent understanding of the concept of desire.6 
the contextual reading finds some support in Hegel’s opening remarks in the 
chapter “Self-Consciousness.” He identifies self-consciousness with desire immedi-
ately following a remark on self-consciousness’s need for “unity” in the face of this 
apparent division, stating “this unity must become essential to self-consciousness, 
i.e. self-consciousness is desire in general” (¶167). if unity is the goal of the observed 
consciousness qua self-consciousness, it would be understandable that Hegel now 
characterizes the observed consciousness as desirous. At this point in the Phenom-
enology it finds itself, for the first time, forced to give up a very basic aspect of its 
self-understanding—the assumption of the absolute independence of objects of 
cognition characteristic of the first three chapters of the Phenomenology—and, as 
a result, it now aims to reconcile the second moment of consciousness with the 
natural point of view it is reluctant to leave behind entirely.
this reading of the concept of desire also has the benefit of cohering with 
a very reasonable understanding of the central result of the later discussion in 
“Lordship and Bondage.” this section ends with Hegel’s account of the integra-
tion of two forms of consciousness within one subject; the figure of the bondsman 
is revealed to contain essential marks of the lord’s cognition, but only implicitly, 
or in itself (an sich) (¶194). Viewed formally, Hegel’s account of the bondsman 
as a synthesis of two different aspects of subjectivity suggests that it embodies the 
desired solution to the two-moments problem.7
6 McDowell states, “Hegel offers ‘Self-consciousness is desire überhaupt ’ (¶167) as a paraphrase, 
not here further elaborated, of one of his schematic descriptions of the required movement. . . .  We 
understand what Hegel means by introducing desire only to the extent that we understand those 
schematic descriptions of the movement of self-consciousness. ‘Desire überhaupt ’ functions as a figure 
for the general idea of negating otherness by appropriating or consuming, incorporating into oneself, 
what at first figures as merely other. that is, schematically, what self-consciousness has to do to the first 
moment in its doubled object” (John McDowell, “the Apperceptive i and the empirical Self: towards 
a Heterodox Reading of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology” [“the Apperceptive i”], 
Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 47/48 [2003]: 1–16, at 5–6). McDowell proposes, in other 
words, to regard desire not as a product of Hegel’s dialectic, but as a different way of picking out that 
dialectical progression. this heterodox reading is a variation on a more traditional approach to the 
appearance of desire that takes the observed consciousness to be desirous insofar as it aims at proving 
the central result of “Force and the Understanding”—that consciousness is the essential moment in 
its relation to objects. While the general structure of the Phenomenology suggests this more traditional 
form of the contextual approach to desire, considered as a complete account of the concept of desire 
it faces the same kind of problem as McDowell’s, that of failing to give sense to the role played by 
desire in the experience of the bondsman at the end of “Lordship and Bondage.”
7 While i believe that the integration of these two moments of consciousness in general is one of 
the central results of “Lordship and Bondage,” one need not adhere to the contextual reading of the
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While the contextual reading has some initial plausibility, it is also essential 
to note just how limited a role it accords to the concept of desire within the de-
velopments of “Self-Consciousness.” in taking the term ‘desire’ to pick out an at-
titude that the observed consciousness bears toward some aspect of itself, we are 
committed to regarding it as little more than a label for the central problem of 
this chapter. As a consequence, difficulties arise for the contextual reading when 
we consider the role played by desire later in “Self-Consciousness.” in “Lordship 
and Bondage,” for example, Hegel asserts that the bondsman comes to contain 
the negativity or being-for-self of the lord only once the bondsman’s desire is trans-
formed by its commitment to serving the lord, thus becoming desire “held in 
check” (gehemmte Begierde) or work (Arbeit), as opposed to the merely natural desire 
described in ¶¶174–76. in this later context, desire is unambiguously a relation 
to objects, not an attitude that the observed consciousness bears to aspects of 
itself that appear essential but irreconcilable.8 of course there is a kind of work 
done by the bondsman upon itself that deserves the title ‘Bildung’ or ‘formation’ 
(¶197), but this work does not aim at a physical change in a living being. in ad-
dition, it is the modification of the bondsman’s desire that constitutes this turning 
point in the Phenomenology, while the contextual reading of desire must take the 
second moment of consciousness—which is related to the lord, the apparently 
abstract “i” that we might think of as a mere point of view on the world—to be the 
subject of desire. And since Hegel never describes a relation to another subject 
as desirous, McDowell’s approach to these issues, which takes the relation of lord 
to bondsman to be a reappearance of the two-moments problem from the point 
of view of the observed consciousness—a reappearance of a relation of desire, 
on this reading—fails to fit the text in a further, significant way.9 thus despite its 
initial plausibility, this formulation of the contextual reading cannot be the cor-
rect approach to Hegel’s concept of desire.
Perhaps this reading can be saved if we expand our notion of the background 
used to understand the concept of desire. if we take Hegel’s identification of 
self-consciousness and desire to be an elucidation of a feature of consciousness 
that has been implicit throughout the development of the Phenomenology, then 
the previous (and subsequent) experiences of consciousness could serve as mate-
rial for interpreting Hegel’s concept of desire. the movement from the chapter 
“Sense Certainty” to the beginning of “Self-Consciousness” could then be read as 
an illustration of Hegel’s claim in the introduction that consciousness is “some-
thing that goes beyond itself” (das Hinausgehen  . . .  über sich selbst) (¶80), which, 
once exhibited in the Phenomenology proper, gets summed up in the claim that 
concept of desire in order to hold this view. the problem of unifying the two moments of conscious-
ness is evident in the text independent of Hegel’s use of the concept of desire. in section four below, 
i explain how the Fichtean reading of desire that i advocate enables us to provide a more satisfying 
account of the end of “Lordship and Bondage.”
8 in section two i consider how, as a relation to objects, desire also figures in a self-relation. i should 
note here that i take these to be two distinct relations. McDowell recognizes, of course, that Hegel 
describes desire as a relation to objects, but he takes this relation to be identical with the relation to 
self picked out by the contextual reading of desire. it is, on his reading, this self relation as it appears 
to the observed consciousness (McDowell, “the Apperceptive i,” 6–7). 
9 McDowell, “the Apperceptive i,” 11.
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self-consciousness is desire in general.10 on this reading, self-consciousness is best 
viewed as desire in general because it is the kind of thing that aims at ends, is goal-
oriented, and thus “moves” due to some inner force or principle. the desire for 
unity described in ¶167 would, accordingly, be an instance of this general mark 
of consciousness.11
this proposed modification of the contextual reading of Hegel’s concept of 
desire faces two significant difficulties. First, it leaves open the question of why this 
facet of consciousness becomes explicit here and not elsewhere. An appeal to the 
goal of unifying both moments of consciousness is nothing more than a return to 
the first form of this reading of Hegel,12 and no other features of the text appear 
capable of explaining the origin of the concept of desire within the framework 
of the contextual reading. Second, and more importantly, such a broad notion of 
desire frustrates any attempt to give a determinate sense to the notion of desire 
“held in check” that plays such an important role in the dialectic of lordship and 
bondage. What could the hemming-in of a fundamental feature of the observed 
consciousness, present in any development in the Phenomenology, have to do with 
the act of setting oneself the end of serving another subject? of course one might 
maintain that the concept of desire found in the dialectic of lordship and bond-
age is a particular instance of the genus “desire in general” that appears in ¶167 
(which, on the modified contextual reading, just is the activity of consciousness), 
but without any textual evidence to support the claim that there are two distinct 
concepts of desire present in “Self-Consciousness,” related as genus to species, the 
inability of the contextual reading to make sense of later developments in “Lord-
ship and Bondage” constitutes a significant shortcoming of this view.
2 .  d e s i r e  a n d  l i f e
in light of the inadequacy of the contextual reading of Hegel’s identification of 
self-consciousness and desire, it is reasonable to conclude that this claim is intended 
10 Judith Butler maintains that Hegel’s concept of desire picks out just such a general, defining 
mark of consciousness in general. Butler notes, for example, that “the appearance of desire at this 
juncture is curious, for if the progress of the Phenomenology is impelled by desire, why does desire 
emerge as an explicit theme only in the fourth chapter of the text?” (Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire 
[new York: Columbia University Press, 1987], 24). She answers, in part, that “desire appears, but the 
moment of appearance is not necessarily the initial moment of its efficacy. in a sense, nothing comes 
into existence ex nihilo for Hegel; everything comes into explicit form from a potential or implicit 
state; indeed, everything has, in a sense, been there all along” (Butler, Subjects of Desire, 24). While i 
agree with Butler that Hegel offers nothing like a construction or derivation of desire—this is one way 
in which his methodology will differ from Fichte’s—this fact should not, i think, lead us to conclude 
that the concept of desire picks out such a general aspect of subjectivity.
11 in articulating this form of the contextual reading of desire, i ignore an additional problem 
the reading must face. Hegel introduces desire in ¶167 in an account of self-consciousness, the sec-
ond moment of what i have called the two-moments problem. But Butler’s version of the contextual 
reading requires that we understand the appearance of desire in terms of Hegel’s remarks in the 
introduction concerning consciousness in general. of course, it is true that consciousness in general is 
self-consciousness for Hegel, in the sense that all awareness of objects presupposes an implicit relation 
to oneself. But this relation to self is just one aspect of consciousness in general, as Hegel’s terminol-
ogy in ¶167 makes clear.
12 this is Butler’s strategy for dealing with the problem. She states, “if this unity is to take place, and 
one of the terms of this unity is the sensuous world, then it makes sense to assume that self-consciousness 
itself must have a sensuous expression” (Butler, Subjects of Desire, 33). the sensuous expression Butler 
has in mind is, of course, desire.
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as a characterization of the capacities of rational, sentient beings, not simply as a 
remark about the observed consciousness at this point in the Phenomenology. the 
concept of desire must, accordingly, be understood through appeal to claims He-
gel makes at this point in the work concerning consciousness and its objects. one 
route that immediately suggests itself involves the emergence of the companion 
concept of life during the transition from “Consciousness” to “Self-Consciousness.” 
this concept is introduced in ¶168 in order to articulate a consequence of the 
identification of self-consciousness and desire, that the object of desire is a living 
thing.13 it is not immediately clear why this claim about life is a consequence of 
what has come before, but if we attend to Hegel’s remarks concerning life, a single 
interpretation of the concept of desire emerges. 
the central mark of life in the rather bewildering discussion of ¶¶168–71 is 
self-preservation; life is a “self-developing whole which dissolves its development 
and in this movement simply preserves itself” (¶171). While Hegel does not offer 
an illuminating characterization of that which is preserved, he evidently intends for 
the reader to understand this self-preservation on analogy with the maintenance 
of form or shape found in an individual living being, a notion that he describes 
in a recognizably kantian manner.14 Just as individual living beings preserve them-
selves as the matter that constitutes them changes, life as a whole preserves itself as 
individual living beings and kinds of beings change and pass away. But this analogy 
fails in one important way. Hegel describes life as “infinite,” “independent,” and 
the “pure movement of axial rotation” (¶¶169–71) in order to indicate that, from 
our point of view, life is a substance, an entity that depends upon nothing else for 
its existence. individual living beings do not have this independence since they 
depend upon life as a whole for their sustenance. it is this difference between life 
and individual living things that Hegel appeals to in explaining the experience 
of the observed consciousness in ¶¶174–75, where the merely desiring subject 
learns that it is dependent upon its living environment.
Hegel’s discussion of life and living beings, with their characteristic mark of 
self-determination, suggests one way of understanding the concept of desire. 
Since living beings preserve themselves—that is, maintain their form—desire can 
be viewed as that feature of the organism responsible for such self-preservation. 
this understanding of the concept of desire gains support from the first, implicit 
appearance of the concept in the Phenomenology. the chapter “Sense Certainty” 
concludes with a very brief discussion of “the practical sphere” in which Hegel 
identifies desire as the feature of animal life responsible for the consumption of 
13 talk of life actually appears earlier, in ¶162, where Hegel clearly is not discussing living things 
considered either individually or collectively, but rather the notion of self-determination in general. 
in what follows i focus on Hegel’s narrow notion of life articulated in ¶¶168–71.
14 in §64 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, kant describes a living thing as something that 
is both cause and effect of itself, that is, something that develops itself and thereby maintains itself 
(immanuel kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and eric Matthews 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 243; Kants gesammelte Schriften [Ak], ed. Deutsche 
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 29 vols. [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902–], 5:370). this is 
clearly the notion of self-preservation that Hegel appeals to when he terms life a living thing (¶171), 
even though Hegel maintains that the self-preservation of life ought not to be considered as persis-
tence of form.
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objects (¶109). Hegel does not actually use the term ‘Begierde’ in this passage, but 
it is clear that he intends his later discussion of desire as a return to this initial 
contrast between theoretical and practical relations to objects and to oneself.15 
Looking at the matter in this way has the advantage of tying Hegel’s concerns in 
the chapter to familiar themes in the work of predecessors such as kant, Fichte, 
and Schelling, but it also faces a serious problem.16 While it makes sense of He-
gel’s invocation of life in ¶168, understanding desire in terms of life also makes 
the identification of self-consciousness with desire even more mysterious. How 
could a capacity that human beings share with mere animals be identical with, or 
somehow constitute, a relation to self? Adopting this reading of Hegel’s concept 
of desire appears to give us very little to go on in interpreting this crucial step in 
the Phenomenology.
At this point, it is tempting to give up the assumption that, in talking about 
self-consciousness, Hegel means to pick out apperception itself, our awareness of 
ourselves in relation to an object. this is the strategy of contemporary Hegelians 
such as Robert Pippin and terry Pinkard, who provide “non-metaphysical” read-
ings of the Phenomenology.17 on Pippin’s influential reading, which actually takes 
kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories as its starting point, the fourth 
chapter of the Phenomenology presents us with an “anthropological representation” 
of a model of cognition intended to replace that of “Consciousness,” which took 
cognition to involve a passive, merely observational relation to an independently 
existing given element.18 For Pippin, the term “self-consciousness” picks out this 
new model of cognition, account giving, and explanation, which does not rely on 
an appeal to anything merely given as a basis for the determinacy or legitimacy of 
a particular judgment or claim.19 Cognition is now to be understood as an active 
determination of the object, an act of taking an object to be such-and-such that 
is, at the same time, an awareness of the various commitments that the subject 
has taken on as a result of making such a judgment or claim. Understanding 
cognition in this way obviously requires that we regard the subjects of such cog-
15 in ¶109, Hegel states that in their relations to sensuous things, animals are “completely assured 
of their nothingness” (in der völligen Gewißheit ihrer Nichtigkeit). Similarly, the merely desiring subject he 
considers much later in the Phenomenology, in ¶174, is described as “certain of the nothingness” (der 
Nichtigkeit  . . .  gewiß) of that which confronts it. the parallel language in these two sections suggests 
that the concept of desire picks out a determination of living things. 
16 kant defines life as “the faculty of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire” 
(immanuel kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor [Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997], 8; Ak 5:10). Both Fichte and Schelling attempt to integrate their accounts of agency and 
natural teleology. i discuss Fichte’s views in sections three and four below.
17 Pippin uses the term ‘non-metaphysical’ to pick out readings of Hegel that do not take him to 
be engaged in the traditional metaphysical project of pursuing a priori knowledge of substance (Rob-
ert Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 5–6). in both Pippin’s 
and Pinkard’s work there is also, however, a tendency to de-psychologize Hegel in such a way that his 
remarks on cognition no longer pick out mental faculties or acts. it is this latter tendency that i think 
should be resisted, as i argue below. 
18 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 163. 
19 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 149. Pippin’s willingness to substitute talk of claim-making for Hegel’s 
talk of cognition demonstrates that Pippin does not take this chapter of the Phenomenology to be 
concerned with self-conscious experience per se. this assumption underlies the project of producing 
a “non-metaphysical” account of cognition, one devoid of psychological content or a metaphysics of 
experience.
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nition as, in an important sense, self-conscious; apperception is the condition 
of a subject’s awareness that, in determining the object, it has committed itself 
to giving up that claim should future experience (i.e., future determinations of 
objects) have a certain character. Similarly, any experience of the inadequacy of 
a particular conceptual determination of reality also involves an essentially ap-
perceptive awareness of the way in which that aspect of our conceptual scheme 
fails to accord with others. But for Pippin, Hegel’s term ‘self-consciousness’ picks 
out the most general ways in which a reflective subject might understand its rela-
tion to objects—the conceptual moments of that relation—and not that capacity 
for reflection or apperception itself, which on this reading is simply presupposed 
throughout the Phenomenology.20
the understanding of cognition labeled ‘self-consciousness’ is identified with 
desire in general, Pippin claims, because the self-determination of a desiring be-
ing is analogous to the self-determination of a set of conceptual determinations 
of reality, which are determined only by other conceptual capacities (not by any 
merely given feature of the world) and thus can be regarded as self-grounded 
and self-determining—as an aspect of spirit (Geist).21 on this view, the concept of 
desire appears rather suddenly in ¶167 because it serves only to designate, in a 
provisional manner, the understanding of cognition that has already emerged as 
a result of the failure of the realist position of “Consciousness.”
Pippin’s approach to “Self-Consciousness” yields a more coherent Phenomenol-
ogy than almost all previous readings of this chapter. it shows how the emergence 
of concepts such as desire and life can be viewed as a step in the development of 
Hegel’s account of cognition as an active determination of reality that is both self-
developing and capable of giving an account of itself independent of the “fact” of 
judgment that grounds kant’s metaphysical deduction of the categories. Pippin’s 
reading also finds some support in the discussion of animal desire in ¶109 since 
he takes the chapter “Self-Consciousness” to have as its primary focus a more ad-
equate account of a subject’s relation to objects, and the relation to an object is the 
explicit topic of ¶109. Furthermore, the introduction of a subject’s dependence on 
another subject as the essential constraint on conceptual activity (which appears 
even more clearly in Pinkard’s reading of “Lordship and Bondage”) is a Hegelian 
idea that still possesses considerable promise.22 nevertheless, this reading of “Self-
20 “it is important to note that Hegel is not engaged in any account of the ‘origin’ of self-con-
sciousness, as if he were maintaining that human beings ‘become’ self-conscious in interaction with 
others. What he wants in this section is an account of the determinate and objective forms of self-
consciousness, an issue that is a problem for him because of his insistence on the ‘independence’ of 
self-consciousness” (Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 291).
21 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 146. there plainly exists an isomorphism between the relation of a 
living, desiring being to life, and the relation of a rational being to spirit. We can therefore explain 
the appearance of spirit at this point in the work in a couple of ways. Most obviously, Hegel intro-
duces spirit in ¶177 because he has just noted that his account of self-consciousness and rationality 
in general will have a social component. A self-conscious agent and knower will, for Hegel, find itself 
as some part of a social whole. But we also have the structure of spirit before us in the thought of life 
as a self-developing whole that contains living beings as its parts. this relation between life and spirit 
underlies Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s concept of desire; the concept of desire is to prepare us for the 
appearance, or emergence, of spirit within the Phenomenology.
22 Robert Brandom’s recent work on conceptual content is one clear example of Hegel’s effect 
on contemporary work in philosophy. See his Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
Commitment (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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Consciousness” fails to fit the text in significant ways and thus cannot be accepted 
as a complete account of Hegel’s intentions in “Self-Consciousness.”
one shortcoming of Pippin’s approach concerns the emergence of distinc-
tively practical considerations at this point in the work. in ¶109 Hegel notes that 
his discussion of desire serves to “anticipate how the case stands in the practical 
sphere,” which clearly indicates that he intends “Self-Consciousness” to enact some 
kind of a turn towards the practical. this talk of the practical sphere could, of 
course, pick out a number of different notions, ranging from distinctively ethical 
concerns to the “agency” and “activity” of consciousness in general considered as 
a kind of spontaneity. this latter notion of the practical does in fact cohere with 
Pippin’s reading of “Self-Consciousness.” He finds in the concept of desire a pro-
visional description of the “acting, desiring, purposive nature of a self-conscious 
subject” considered merely as such.23 But it is difficult to see how this very general 
understanding of the practical can be made to fit the developments that confront 
the reader in “Self-Consciousness.” Hegel’s talk of the consumption of an object, 
the fear of death, and the work performed upon a physical object for the sake 
of pleasing another subject all suggest a more straightforward understanding of 
the practical here. 
of course, Pippin need not deny that there is a real practical dimension to these 
developments. He makes clear, in fact, that Hegel is committed to regarding the 
articulation and development of norms of thought and action as a social, historical 
process. My concern is that in focusing on the emergence of what we might call 
a purely normative idealism, Pippin fails to recognize that Hegel is, at the same 
time, providing us with an account of the subjects who operate with these norms 
(and that the claim that such subjects are embodied, desiring beings is not simply 
a corollary of the argument for a normative idealism). establishing that this is in 
fact Hegel’s aim is the task of sections three and four below, but the plausibility 
of this view on the appearance of desire and other practical phenomena is clear, i 
think, from Hegel’s rather detailed descriptions of these phenomena. to take the 
bondsman’s work as an example, Pippin is committed to regarding the unground-
edness of work, not its status as a determination of a subject’s conative capacities, as 
Hegel’s reason for introducing the notion. But while it is true that the bondsman’s 
work is not grounded in any merely natural phenomenon or fact, and is an act of 
service only insofar as lord and bondsman regard it as an act of service, it seems 
that Hegel could have made this point without offering an account of the form 
of the object of work, the fear that motivates formative activity, or the bondsman’s 
awareness of the reality of the end it pursues.24 Hegel’s elaborate description of the 
phenomenon of work certainly seems to indicate an interest in just this practical 
relation to an object (and, as i will argue, to oneself), not simply an interest in 
the ungroundedness of our operation with norms of action.25
23 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 148.
24 these topics, the subject of ¶¶194–96, warrant a much more extensive discussion than i will 
be able to offer in this context. See section four and my concluding remarks for a sketch of how their 
relation to desire might be understood.
25 Pippin claims, in addition, that when Hegel talks about the “pure negativity” found in the 
bondsman’s work, or its “pure being-for-self,” he means to pick out only the self-determination of work 
(Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 162). As i argue in sections three and four below, it is more natural to see here
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terry Pinkard’s discussion of the emergence of desire in “Self-Consciousness” 
employs a similarly broad notion of the practical in explaining the appearance 
of desire in the Phenomenology. on Pinkard’s view, Hegel’s focus never strays from 
the generally epistemological themes introduced in “Consciousness.” He states 
that by ‘self-consciousness’ Hegel has in mind, in the opening paragraphs of the 
chapter, a “new, more reflective conception of what counts as knowledge.”26 this 
new conception involves understanding knowledge of objects not as apprehension, 
but as a form of acting guided by a subject’s ends. As Pinkard puts it, “the agent 
has various desires that demand satisfaction, and his conceptualizing activities 
are tools for the satisfaction of those desires.”27 in his analysis, Pinkard attributes 
to Hegel two independent claims, which are not always distinguished. First, there 
is a claim about knowledge, namely, that all knowledge requires an active deter-
mination of the object by the subject.28 Second, there is the claim that all such 
activity is ultimately in the service of desire satisfaction, insofar as the goodness of 
concepts and reasons for belief is to be judged through appeal to “life’s various 
desires and demands.”29 each claim can be viewed as constituting a turn toward 
the practical in “Self-Consciousness.” the first claim is essentially Pippin’s point 
concerning self-determining conceptual determinations of reality, and i will not 
discuss it further. the second, however, is unique to Pinkard’s interpretation of 
Hegel and suggests a different approach to the claim that self-consciousness is 
desire in general.
if we take Hegel to be claiming that all conceptual activity is in the service of 
our desires or interests, he would be asserting a primacy of the practical within 
our cognition of objects insofar as claims to knowledge, or claims concerning the 
validity of a concept, would be settled through appeal to our needs, ends, and 
projects. Self-consciousness, understood as a cognitive standpoint, would then be 
desire in general insofar as the force responsible for the evolution of our concepts 
would be located in human interest in its various forms. if desire played such a 
role in the Phenomenology, the developments of “Self-Consciousness” would indeed 
constitute a turn to the “practical sphere,” but this is not, i think, the kind of turn 
to the practical that Hegel presents in the Phenomenology. this proposal fails to fit 
the text of the first two sections of “Self-Consciousness,” where Hegel quite clearly 
presents an account of the development of desire itself, not an account of desire 
setting in motion changes in a set of concepts.30 the independence found in the 
a concern with a subject’s relation to itself in distinctively practical activity. this is in part because on 
Pippin’s reading very little is accomplished in “Lordship and Bondage”—we simply move from the 
incomplete, merely natural self-determination characteristic of natural desire to the more complete 
self-determination of work. in saying this, however, i do not pretend to have given anything close to a 
complete response to Pippin’s account of the practical dimension of “Self-Consciousness.” 
26 terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 46.
27 Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 49.
28 “our conceptualizing activities are not to be construed on the model of our apprehending objects; 
knowing something is construed instead as a form of acting” (Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 49).
29 Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 48. Pinkard later asserts that “whatever contrasts we may make 
in describing the world are sustainable only to the extent that they function to satisfy these desires 
better than some alternative set of contrasts” (Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 49).
30 By ‘the development of desire itself’ i do not mean a change in the concept of desire at work 
in this part of the Phenomenology, but rather a development of the role played by desire in the successive
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mere self-determination of desire is first revealed to be a kind of dependence, 
insofar as desires simply appear within a subject, and can be satisfied only if the 
world offers up the conditions of their satisfaction. once the desiring subject comes 
to bear a recognitive relation to another such subject, this dependence upon life 
develops into the independence that is one of Hegel’s central concerns in this 
section. Desire “held in check” by the recognition of another subject implicitly 
contains the independence, being-for-self, or freedom that constitutes the essence 
of self-consciousness, as expressed in ¶¶166–67.
there is one further textual problem to consider here. the general interpretive 
strategy shared by Pippin and Pinkard succeeds in providing an account of Hegel’s 
apparent turn to the practical that engages with his concerns in “Consciousness” 
only by reading the term ‘self-consciousness’ as a name for a new understanding of 
objective cognition that regards cognition as essentially involving various reflective, 
conceptual moments, while Hegel’s use of this term often seems to pick out not 
only the ways in which we relate to ourselves and to objects, but that very capacity 
to bear such relations—kantian apperception, the root of Cartesian certainty.31 
While Hegel does begin by characterizing self-consciousness as a “new shape of 
knowing,” this new shape is quickly distinguished through appeal to its object in the 
claim that this knowing is the knowing of itself (¶167). He could have a number 
of “objects” in mind here. the knowing of knowing could designate knowledge 
of the subject, knowledge of its essential concepts or categories, or knowledge of 
that activity by means of which a subject deploys its concepts. Hegel most likely 
has all of these topics in mind to some degree, but in focusing exclusively on the 
activity of knowing and the concepts involved, neither Pippin nor Pinkard engages 
directly with Hegel’s interest in the self-relation itself.
the title of this chapter, “the truth of Self-Certainty,” indicates that Hegel 
is concerned with offering an account of what, in truth, the certainty of self first 
described in “Sense Certainty” is. Just as the observed consciousness of “Sense 
Certainty” was certain of the existence of an independently existing sensible given, 
it took itself to be immediately acquainted with itself (¶101). of course the mere 
utterance of ‘i’ was revealed to be an inadequate expression of this certainty of self 
(¶¶102–03), but the certainty itself never disappeared in the Phenomenology. on 
the contrary, this certainty becomes the explicit theme of “Self-Consciousness,” 
as Hegel indicates in his assertion in ¶166 that “the certainty is to itself its own 
object” once the observed consciousness gives up its attempt to explain all cogni-
tion in terms of an essentially passive relation to an independently existing entity. 
the question that Hegel means to confront is this: What is the certainty of self 
that was merely designated in “Sense Certainty”? And it would seem that the answer 
he means to give involves the concept of desire. in addition to asserting that self-
experiences of the observed consciousness. See the end of section three for a brief account of how 
i believe these earlier appearances of desire ought to be understood once we see what desire is and 
how it functions at the end of “Lordship and Bondage.”
31 Hegel’s opening remark in “Self-Consciousness” that certainty of self is “a certainty which 
is identical with its truth” (¶166)—that is, one that could not conceivably vanish for the observed 
consciousness as a result of its future experiences—clearly evokes Descartes. Hegel is much more 
interested, however, in the idea of a self-relation in general, as is obvious from his quick transition to 
a generally Fichtean account of this self-relation in relation to an object in ¶167.
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consciousness is desire in general, Hegel goes on to assert that self-consciousness 
is “certain of itself” only through doing away with a physical object, and that by 
examining such certainty we are on our way to an account of a “true certainty” 
of self, “a certainty which has become explicit for self-consciousness itself in an 
objective manner” (¶174).
While these considerations count against the exclusively non-metaphysical ap-
proach to Hegel’s concept of desire found in the work of Pippin and Pinkard, this 
rough characterization of Hegel’s aims of course generates as many questions as it 
answers. For example, we still do not have a clear picture of what Hegel means to 
account for—what aspect of the relation to self he means to illuminate. there is 
also the problem of understanding what such illumination could consist in. it would 
appear that if Hegel means to explain how self-conscious subjects such as ourselves 
came to exist within a world of mere matter or life, his remarks on desire, recogni-
tion, and the social relation of lord to bondsman would fall almost comically short 
of this goal. this second problem could support a reading of the Phenomenology as 
presupposing self-consciousness as a “fact” that underlies Hegel’s investigation as a 
whole, much as the fact of the meditator’s sanity underlies Descartes’s project in the 
Meditations.32 this is, roughly, Pippin’s position, which takes Hegel to presuppose 
apperception and to focus on its various conceptual moments. While i agree with 
Pippin that Hegel has no interest in explaining the emergence of apperception 
from mere matter or life, i believe we must also conclude that Hegel does aim to 
provide some kind of explanation of apperception itself through the elucidation 
of conditions under which the capacity for reflection presupposed throughout 
the Phenomenology is possible. on this reading, desire serves as one feature of the 
context in which an apperceptive “i” can exist.33
3 .  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s
Approaching Hegel’s use of the concept of desire in this manner involves seeing 
his argument in “Self-Consciousness” as deeply indebted to Fichte, but not so much 
the Fichte of the 1794 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, who sought to 
derive notions such as representation, the “not-i,” and the practical activity of the 
“i” from the mere thought of the self-positing subject. this side of Fichte’s thought 
certainly appears in the Phenomenology, taking a prominent position at the beginning 
of the sections “Consciousness,” “Self-Consciousness,” and “Reason.” the sensible, 
intuitive certainty found in the “i” (¶¶100–01), the “mere tautology” of “i am i” 
(¶167), and the expansion of this certainty into the idealist proposition that the 
“i” is all reality (¶233) are all expressions of Fichte’s starting point, but Hegel finds 
them to be “unscientific” assertions, and for this reason suspect. this fact should 
not, however, lead us to conclude that Hegel’s engagement with Fichte in these 
sections of the Phenomenology is always unsympathetic. His treatment of notions 
32 there are important disanalogies here as well. For example, while one’s sanity can be doubted, 
self-consciousness as an act or Faktum of the subject certainly cannot be doubted. 
33 Hegel certainly does not regard desire as a sufficient condition of self-consciousness. Both Hegel 
and Fichte regard the recognition of another subject as equally essential. i would also hesitate to clas-
sify desire as a strictly necessary condition of any self-conscious experience for Hegel. See section four 
for a discussion of this important difference between Fichte and Hegel.
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from the Natural Right and System of Ethics is much less critical. For example, the 
appearance of the concept of recognition in “Lordship and Bondage” constitutes 
a significant Fichtean inheritance, regardless of the quite different roles played 
by this concept in the Natural Right and Phenomenology. And this is not the only 
significant element of Fichte’s thought to make an appearance in the Phenomenol-
ogy. As i will argue, Fichte’s general project in the Natural Right and System of Ethics, 
and the role played in that project by his concept of drive (Trieb), had a significant 
effect on Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness and desire. 
one of the principal aims of Fichte’s applied works is to substantiate the claim 
that his system alone is able to demonstrate the existence of a certain “unity and 
connection” within the subject’s various capacities.34 this aim is clearest in the 
introduction to the System of Ethics, where Fichte makes the following assertion.
i find myself as effecting [wirkend] in the world of sense. From this all consciousness 
begins [hebt . . .  an]. Without this consciousness of my own efficacy, there is no self-
consciousness; without self-consciousness, there is no consciousness of something 
else that is not supposed to be i myself.35 
that Fichte is eager to articulate necessary relations between self-consciousness, 
efficacy, and objective experience is not surprising to the reader of the 1794 Wis-
senschaftslehre, but in the System of Ethics the particular relations between practical 
activity and other aspects of our experience are new and innovative. While in the 
Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte sought to demonstrate that the practical activity of striving 
(Streben) and its resistance through a check (Anstoß) constitute the condition of any 
experience of an object—“no striving, no object,” as Fichte put the point—in the 
System of Ethics practical activity, here designated by the term ‘effecting’, is such a 
condition only indirectly.36 effecting appears as a condition of self-consciousness, 
which is itself a condition of objective experience. the same primacy of the prac-
tical in accounting for other aspects of our experience appears in the Natural 
Right, where Fichte asserts that “the practical faculty is the innermost root of the 
i; everything else is placed upon and attached to this faculty . . .  all other attempts 
to deduce the i in self-consciousness have been unsuccessful.”37 in linking practi-
cal capacities to the subject’s relation to itself, Fichte in effect gives up his earlier 
strategy for demonstrating the interconnectedness of subjective capacities through 
appeal to the conditions of objective experience.38
34 Fichte, The Science of Knowledge: with the First and Second Introductions [Wissenschaftslehre], trans. 
Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 259; SW 1:295. 
35 Fichte, System of Ethics, 8–9; SW 4:3 (translation emended).
36 Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, 231; SW 1:261–62. in the System of Ethics, Fichte uses the term ‘effect-
ing’ to pick out an effective act of willing, that is, an action-guiding “demand” that a state of affairs 
obtain. At times Fichte goes so far as to equate effecting with the combination of an act of willing and 
the reality of the willed state of affairs. See System of Ethics, 72; SW 4:70.
37 Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right [Natural Right], ed. Frederick neuhouser, trans. Michael 
Bauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 21; SW 3:21.
38 of course the Anstoß or “check” is still in a sense practical, insofar as it is the experience of a 
constraint on the activity of thought. that all cognition requires that a subject be active, or “practi-
cal” in this sense, is the claim found in Pippin’s and Pinkard’s readings of Hegel. in emphasizing the 
importance of the practical for self-consciousness, both in Fichte and in Hegel, i take an approach to 
Hegel that is different from that of most commentators. For another example of the Anstoß reading of 
Hegel’s concerns in “Self-Consciousness,” see Frederick neuhouser, “Deducing Desire and Recognition 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1986): 243–62.
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it is important to note that, in attempting to explain a subject’s relation to itself 
in terms of its practical capacities, Fichte in no way means to suggest that these 
practical capacities are themselves independently intelligible. Willing and effecting 
undoubtedly require the capacity to represent an object. As Fichte states in the 
Natural Right, “one will readily acknowledge—as it has been for a long time—that 
all willing is conditioned by representing: i must represent whatever i will.”39 Fichte 
seeks instead to demonstrate that, insofar as some aspects of any positing activity 
of a subject are conditioned by the presence and exercise of practical capacities, 
there exists a primacy of the practical within cognition in general.40 
Fichte’s argument for such a primacy turns on the claim in the passage above 
that all consciousness “begins” with an experience in which the subject “finds” 
itself. it should be clear from the intended function of Fichte’s account that such 
finding is not an event in the development of a particular subject, and that talk 
of the beginning of all consciousness does not pick out a beginning in time. the 
temporal notions of finding and beginning are meant to pick out the relative 
priority of the practical in an account of self-consciousness, not a temporal priority 
within the developmental history of a single subject. For Fichte, to say that self-
consciousness begins with a particular experience is to say that self-consciousness 
considered as apperception, the mere ability to form the representation ‘i’, is 
conditioned by features of that experience. He maintains that the apperceptive 
subject must be capable of experiencing itself as an agent, since it is only in its 
agency that a subject has before itself its own characteristic activity or spontaneity 
in a determinate form.41 Such a determinate form is required if a subject’s activity 
is to become an object for it, that is, if a subject is to be capable of finding itself as 
a subject. And since we are all, undoubtedly, present to ourselves as active subjects, 
Fichte maintains that all capacities constitutive of agency are necessary aspects of 
subjectivity in general. the simple, abstract, apperceptive “i” considered in isola-
tion from such capacities is an unreal philosophical construction. 
to the obvious question of why the subject cannot find its own activity already 
in a determinate form in a theoretical context, such as that of sense perception, 
Fichte responds that a subject’s “activity in intuiting the world cannot be posited 
by the rational being as such, for this world-intuiting activity, by its very concept, 
39 Fichte, Natural Right, 22; SW 3:21. this difference between the Wissenschaftslehre and the ap-
plied works is significant. only in the latter works does Fichte consider self-consciousness exclusively 
in relation to a world of objects, just as Hegel does following “Sense Certainty.”
40 Daniel Breazeale has convincingly argued that Fichte is best understood as maintaining the 
equiprimordiality of theoretical and practical capacities of the “i,” according to which there exist 
theoretical and practical elements within any actual conscious experience (Daniel Breazeale, “the 
theory of Practice and the Practice of theory: Fichte and the ‘Primacy of Practical Reason’,” Interna-
tional Philosophical Quarterly 36 [1996]: 47–64). Günter Zöller also emphasizes this aspect of Fichte’s 
thought in connection with the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo in Fichte’s Transcendental Philosophy: The 
Original Duplicity of Intelligence and Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). in what follows 
i will continue to speak of the primacy, or priority, of the practical in Fichte’s theory of subjectivity 
in order to emphasize the relation of dependence Fichte sees the theoretical “i” bearing towards the 
practical “i,” but it should be kept in mind that the real aim of Fichte’s work is to demonstrate that 
this division between subjective capacities is an unreal construction of the transcendental philosopher. 
As will become clear below, i also read Hegel as advocating the equiprimordiality of theoretical and 
practical capacities in his account of the observed consciousness’s gradual realization that its practical 
capacities are essential to it. 
41 Fichte, System of Ethics, 24–28; SW 4:18–23. 
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is not supposed to revert into the intuiter. . . . ”42 By this, he means that within 
our everyday experience, perception does not appear to the subject as a case of 
self-determination. And since the subject appears to itself as absolutely free and 
unlimited within abstract thought, Fichte takes for granted that mere thinking can-
not contain any experience of the subject as determined in one way or another.43 
on the basis of these phenomenological claims, Fichte is tempted to conclude 
that the experience of willing and pursuing an end constitutes the most basic 
awareness a subject has of itself. 
the appeal to phenomenology is not sufficient, however, to establish the conclu-
sion that the possession and exercise of practical capacities is a necessary condition 
of the “i.” Fichte most likely recognized this point, and in order to substantiate this 
claim in the System of Ethics he constructs an ambitious, extended transcendental 
argument that begins with the fact of self-consciousness and proceeds through the 
construction of an uninterrupted “chain” of conditions of that consciousness.44 For 
our purposes, the most important component of Fichte’s account of the beginning 
of self-consciousness is his notion of a drive (Trieb), one of the final links in this 
chain. Fichte attempts to construct the concept of a drive through formulating 
an “antinomy” that can be resolved only through the postulation of a particular 
determination of the subject, an activity that exists independently of any free act 
of the subject and is felt simply as such.45 the antinomy turns on the possibility of 
finding oneself as a subject in a determinate state. Finding oneself is possible, the 
antithesis maintains, only if a subject cognizes something within itself. But since 
all cognition presupposes this same relation to self, as the thesis states, it would 
appear that no explanation of knowledge or a subject’s “first” consciousness of 
self is possible. Fichte maintains that this antinomy can be solved only through 
the postulation of a necessary determination of the subject that combines knowl-
edge and activity in a single entity. As simply found in a subject, independent of 
the subject’s free activity and involvement, this activity must be no more than a 
tendency (Tendenz) of the subject, present “objectively” as a determination of the 
activity characteristic of the “i” as such. A collection of such determinations is, 
Fichte points out, just what we mean to designate when we assert that a subject 
possesses a nature, a system of drives that it simply finds within itself. But for the 
“i,” the mere existence of a system of natural drives does not constitute any kind 
of awareness of self. Fichte thus concludes that there must exist some immediate 
(nonconceptual, noninferential) awareness of such drives—a feeling that one is 
driven to act in a particular manner. this feeling of a drive, what Fichte calls a 
longing (Sehnen), is the synthesis of knowledge and activity necessary for resolving 
the antinomy in question.46
42 Fichte, Natural Right, 19; SW 3:18.
43 Fichte, System of Ethics, 26; SW 4:20.
44 Fichte, System of Ethics, 77; SW 4:76.
45 Since Fichte resolves his “antinomy” in such a way that the illusion, or conflict of reason, does 
not persist, this clearly is not kant’s notion of an antinomy. kant states of the thesis in an antinomy, 
“both it and its opposite [the antithesis] must involve no mere artificial illusion such as at once vanishes 
upon detection, but a natural and unavoidable illusion, which even after it has ceased to beguile still 
continues to delude though not to deceive us. . . . ” (Kritik der reinen Vernuft, A422/B449–50, in im-
manuel kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. kemp Smith [new York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965], 394). 
46 Fichte, System of Ethics, 102; SW 4:106.
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it must be admitted that this antinomy and its solution are somewhat artificial, 
and it is clear that what really interests Fichte here is not the problem posed by the 
“antinomy,” but his proposed solution. this feeling of being driven to perform a 
particular act is Fichte’s candidate for the beginning of self-consciousness, as de-
scribed in the introduction to the System of Ethics, and as such it occupies a central 
position in his account of the subject and its necessary unity. Unfortunately, Fichte 
fails to make this point as clear as he should.47 His return to the temporal language 
found in the introduction nevertheless marks his theory of drive as the essential 
element in the account of the beginning of self-consciousness. He describes the 
state of longing as “a necessary and immediate consciousness, to which we could 
then attach the series of all additional consciousness”48 and asserts that “my first 
action can be none other than to satisfy the drive.”49 thus we ought to think of 
Fichte’s construction of the feeling of a drive as part of a more comprehensive 
account of the act of willing in which the subject finds itself. the relation to self 
in the feeling of a drive must exist in order for any other awareness of one’s proj-
ects or acts of willing to be possible, for the reason that all acts of practical self-
determination are in relation to a collection of merely given drives that a subject 
regards as its own, as determinations of its own activity. thus, if we are persuaded 
by Fichte’s generally phenomenological argument for the claim that i find myself 
only in willing, as well as his derivation of the notions of drive (Trieb) and longing 
(Sehnen) in his solution to the antinomy, we must conclude that the possession of 
an objective, conative nature is a condition of the possibility of self-consciousness 
and, indeed, any consciousness whatsoever.50
Reading Hegel’s opening moves in “Self-Consciousness” as an articulation of 
this Fichtean position yields a line of argument that fits into the structure of the 
Phenomenology and enables us to make sense of some of the obscurities present 
in Hegel’s text noted above. if we understand the claim that self-consciousness is 
desire in general as an articulation of the Fichtean claim that self-consciousness 
begins with a feeling of a drive, then Hegel’s remarks on desire and life—as well as 
those concerning lordship, bondage, and recognition—would not be an attempt 
to explain in more basic terms the mere fact of apperception, or the gradual de-
velopment over time of an awareness of self. instead, desire would have the status 
of a condition of finding oneself as a self-conscious subject, and the development 
of desire in “Lordship and Bondage” would serve as an account of the conditions 
under which desire can count as—that is, can be understood by the phenomeno-
47 While Fichte tells his reader that a proof of the claim that all consciousness begins with finding 
oneself effecting in the world of sense is to be found in the second chapter of the System of Ethics (SW 
4:3), he furnishes a proof of the claim that “i find myself, as myself, only willing” in the first chapter of 
the book (SW 4:18–23). But Fichte does not regard his proof of the central claim in the introduction 
as complete until he has constructed the concept of a drive.
48 Fichte, System of Ethics, 102; SW 4:106.
49 Fichte, System of Ethics, 104; SW 4:108. Fichte’s mention of a subject’s “first” action in this context 
demonstrates again that his talk of the beginning of consciousness in a particular awareness of self 
picks out an explanatory priority, not a temporal relation.
50 the project of disentangling the phenomenological and more properly transcendental strands 
in Fichte’s argument, and then showing how Fichte understands the relation between the construc-
tion of a proof and the experience of, for example, “thinking the wall” (System of Ethics, 24; SW 4:18) 
is one that i happily set aside.
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logical observer as—a determination of a subject’s activity that is immediately 
present to that subject. Hegel’s desire, like Fichte’s drive, would appear as one 
condition of finding oneself in relation to an object in general, and thus would 
partially constitute the general context in which the apperceptive “i” can exist.
this reading of Hegel is supported by the existence of noteworthy similarities 
between Hegel’s concept of desire and Fichte’s central notions in the System of 
Ethics. Fichte’s definition of a desire as “a longing [Sehnen] that is determined 
through its object”51 clearly resembles Hegel’s concept of desire, insofar as the 
latter notion contains those of a felt relation to self (Selbstgefühl) (¶195) and an 
intentional relation to objects and life generally that is revealed to be one of de-
pendence (¶175). And while Hegel’s concept of desire is not equivalent to any 
single notion found in the System of Ethics (due to the fact that Fichte employs 
distinct terms to designate conative and aesthetic elements of this entity), Fichte’s 
notions of drive and longing match up quite closely with the component parts 
of desire in the Phenomenology. Finally, just as Fichte takes drives to be capable of 
determining something as food, for example, Hegel regards desire as a form of 
negation that determines its objects.52
Approaching the opening sections of “Self-Consciousness” with this Fichtean 
understanding of Hegel’s concerns with self-consciousness and the concept of 
desire involved in his project yields a rough understanding of the turn to the 
practical Hegel is making at this point in the Phenomenology. He postulates a kind 
of primacy of the practical insofar as the concept of desire is introduced as a com-
ponent in Hegel’s account of the “second moment” of consciousness, the relation 
of a subject to itself, which is the central topic of concern for all idealists. But 
apperception is not to be constructed from component parts. Rather, it is taken 
for granted here, as it is in the introduction to the Phenomenology and throughout 
the work, but also illuminated through an account of the role played by conative 
elements of consciousness in a subject’s most basic awareness of itself. the goal 
here is to show that desire plays an essential role in an account of how we con-
scious, rational beings are present to ourselves as subjects—the account that will 
best respond to the needs of the observed consciousness following the first three 
chapters of the Phenomenology.
the observed consciousness has, since “Sense Certainty,” felt a need to explain 
its relation to itself. Following its failure to explain what is meant by ‘i’ through 
appeal to a simple act of “meaning” or intending (Meinen), the observed con-
sciousness abandons the task of accounting for its relation to itself, turning its 
attention instead to the various ways in which a realist relation to an object might 
be understood. And when these various strategies themselves fail, revealing that 
all cognition of objects requires some determining activity on the part of a sub-
ject, the task of understanding consciousness’s relation to itself reappears in an 
51 Fichte, System of Ethics, 121; SW 4:126–27.
52 “i do not feel hunger because there is food for me; instead, something becomes food for me 
because i am hungry” (Fichte, System of Ethics, 118; SW 4:124). in his account of the role of desire in 
the Phenomenology, terry Pinkard emphasizes the way in which in desiring we take an object an object 
to be one way or another (Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology, 50), which i regard as the more important 
notion of negation at work in “Self-Consciousness” (as opposed to the annihilation of the object 
described in ¶174).
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even more urgent manner. if knowledge of objects is to involve as an essential 
moment a reflective act of taking an object to be such-and-such, then the prob-
lem of accounting for a subject’s relation to itself must return to the forefront of 
the Phenomenology’s concerns. Hegel’s Fichtean suggestion at this point is that an 
agent’s awareness of its desires constitutes its most basic awareness of self, insofar 
as this awareness of activity requires no contribution from the subject. We simply 
find ourselves driven to perform an act, and in this experience, are inevitably 
and immediately aware of ourselves as subjects that are determined in this way. 
Regardless of whether we regard Hegel’s argument as turning on the notion of a 
felt determination of oneself, or as appealing to a phenomenological description 
of the experience of committing oneself to a course of action that is not a mere 
function of one’s bodily desires, his conclusion concerns the unique status of 
desire within a subject’s experience of itself.53 it is primarily as desiring subjects 
that we are present to ourselves, and the representation ‘i’ picks out, in the first 
place, the complex phenomenon of determining oneself to act in relation to a set 
of given desires. the view is not that all self-conscious states are states of desire, 
but that desiring is (in the proper circumstances) a self-conscious state, without 
which there would be no “i” at all.54 Hegel, accordingly, sums up the central result 
of “Lordship and Bondage” as the claim that “to think does not mean to be an 
abstract ‘i’, but an ‘i’ which has at the same time the significance of being-in-itself 
[Ansichseins], of being for itself an object [sich Gegenstand sein]” (¶197; transla-
tion emended). in other words, the simple, abstract “i” of apperception is best 
understood as a part of a more complex phenomenon characterized by distinctively 
practical capacities that make possible the presentation of the subject to itself in 
a determined, objective manner. the Hegelian analogue of the Fichtean notion 
of finding oneself in the determinate, objective experience of willing is therefore 
the bondsman’s experience of work, in which its “being-for-self becomes an object 
for it [wird  . . .  zum Gegenstande]” (¶196).
in carrying out this project of demonstrating the interrelation of subjective 
capacities, Fichte and Hegel employ quite different methodologies, and this point 
constitutes one of the most significant differences between Hegel’s Phenomenology 
and Fichte’s applied works. Fichte divides the central claims of his theory of action 
in the System of Ethics into “theorems” and attempts to demonstrate them through 
deductive argument. individual theorems are then related to each other as steps 
53 While Hegel’s talk of a feeling of self (Selbstgefühl ) in ¶195 connects his view with Fichte’s 
construction of the states of drive and longing, i believe his argument to be much more phenom-
enological than Fichte’s, in the sense that it must appeal to the reader’s own reflective experience. 
However, a complete account of Hegel’s theory lies outside the scope of my concerns here. Such an 
account would need to examine the end of “Lordship and Bondage,” where we see for the first time 
how desire appears to a laboring subject and why desire in general must give way to work, as well as 
the very general question of the relation between observed consciousness and phenomenological 
observer in the Phenomenology.
54 Substantiating the claim that Hegel regards some desiring states as themselves self-conscious 
states (as opposed to pre-existing conditions of self-conscious states) would require that we consider 
in detail the bondsman’s experience of work in ¶¶195–96. While such an investigation lies outside 
my scope here, my discussion in section four of the relations between lord and bondsman provides a 
rough sketch of how the bondsman’s experience looks once we see in the Phenomenology a generally 
Fichtean notion of desire. 
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in a single transcendental argument that takes the fact of self-consciousness as its 
starting point and attempts to exhibit claims in the theory of action, teleology, 
ethics, and right as indubitable conditions of the possibility of self-consciousness. 
the theory of drive, for example, is intended to connect Fichte’s account of self-
consciousness to a theory of nature as organized independent of our capacities 
for judgment, and to do so in such a way that the truth of the theory stands as 
a necessary condition of a subject’s finding itself in a state of self-determination 
relative to its natural drives.
in Hegel we find a similar move from the fact of self-consciousness to claims 
about the world inhabited by a self-conscious subject, but the connections between 
individual claims in the Phenomenology are of an importantly different kind. the 
argument does remain transcendental in the broadest sense, an argument from 
a feature of our experience accepted as fact to the conditions of that feature of 
experience. But Hegel does not take the procedure of mathematical proof as his 
model, and this results in both a more convincing argument and a correspond-
ingly weaker conclusion concerning self-consciousness and desire.
First, Hegel does not attempt to construct the concept of desire, as Fichte does 
following his antinomy. the appearance of desire at the end of “Sense Certainty” 
attests to the fact that animal desire is a notion familiar to natural consciousness 
that can enter the dialectic at any point. it appears again quite abruptly in ¶167, 
once the observed consciousness experiences a need to explain its relation to itself, 
and desire is only later shown to occupy an important position in consciousness’s 
understanding of itself insofar as it can be regarded as the objective determination 
of a self-conscious willing subject’s self-determination. in other words, desire first 
appears as nothing more than a familiar feature of our experience (just as space, 
time, and objects of experience do), but the subsequent account of desire’s role 
in self-consciousness constitutes an elucidation of its nature and its relation to 
other capacities previously regarded as unrelated.
the second difference between these two accounts of self-consciousness and 
desire concerns the relations that are postulated between the two concepts. Fichte’s 
transcendental argument from the fact of self-consciousness to the existence of 
bodily drives and a nature towards which they are directed aims to establish the 
impossibility of a subject’s finding itself independent of a cognition of itself as 
driven to perform some action within a background of a teleologically ordered liv-
ing whole. Hegel’s aims are more modest. the self-understanding of the observed 
consciousness at the end of “Force and Understanding” is that of an abstract “i” 
in relation to an object in general, or as we might say, a mere point of view on the 
world. Since the determinacy of the objects of consciousness has been revealed 
as originating in the subject, the observed consciousness now ascribes to itself 
complete independence. in what follows, Hegel’s goal is simply to demonstrate 
to us the relative inferiority of that self-understanding by illustrating the way in 
which such a point of view on the world is connected with those features of the 
subject that were taken to be inessential, such as its animal capacities, through 
their presence in an act of finding oneself. in ¶¶173–75 he shows, first, how a 
desiring subject that has a merely natural, animalistic engagement with the world 
can be seen to be lacking the kind of freedom characteristic of consciousness. the 
123heg el ’ s  co n cept  o f  d es i re
actions of such a subject can be explained by the physical presence or absence of 
objects that satisfy desire. then in ¶¶194–96 of “Lordship and Bondage,” Hegel 
exhibits desire as it appears within the practical experience of a self-conscious 
subject that is, implicitly, free. that very same desire is now a felt need that does 
not directly bring about action, but instead, in light of the bondsman’s commit-
ment to serving the lord, offers a reason for action.
thus we might say that both Fichte and Hegel produce transcendental argu-
ments for the claim that a self-conscious subject finds itself within a teleologically-
ordered natural whole. But while the argument in the System of Ethics proceeds 
by attempting to show that the deduced “nature” of a subject—its collection of 
drives—presupposes a background of an organized whole,55 Hegel’s introduction 
of life involves no such derivation. neither desire nor its relation to self-conscious-
ness is deduced, and there is no argument in ¶¶167–68 (or anywhere else in the 
chapter) for the necessity of assuming a natural whole within which a self-conscious 
subject exists.56 this is why Hegel simply states that, for us, the object has become 
life. the concepts of desire and life, and eventually that of another subject, are 
revealed as interrelated within the observed consciousness’s account of the aspects 
of its own experience that it takes to be essential, but this self-understanding has 
been presupposed from the beginning of the Phenomenology, and the task of “Self-
Consciousness” is simply to illuminate the interrelation between capacities of a 
subject that were previously taken to be unrelated. the argument does concern 
the notion of the conditions of the possibility of a given phenomenon, but it 
does not aim to demonstrate the transcendental necessity of the claim that a self-
conscious subject possesses a system of natural desires. the goal is only to induce 
the observed consciousness and its phenomenological observers, who already 
understand themselves as desiring subjects, to recognize the way in which desire 
is integrated into the fabric of apperceptive experience.
4 .  l o r d ,  b o n d s m a n ,  a n d  t h e  u n i t y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t
Reading Hegel as introducing the concept of desire as an element in an account 
of the beginning of self-consciousness has the further advantage of enabling us 
to see how the figures of lord and bondsman fit into Hegel’s broader concerns 
with illuminating the structure of consciousness. the dialectic of lordship and 
bondage quite clearly has as its end the integration of these two general forms 
55 Fichte, System of Ethics, 110; SW 4:115–16.
56 My claim that Hegel does not regard his theory of life and desire as a necessary condition of 
self-consciousness may appear to conflict with Hegel’s assertion of a “necessary progression” from one 
form of consciousness to the next in the Phenomenology (¶79). But i think that we ought to regard the 
transitions in the Phenomenology as necessary only in the sense of being needed by the observed con-
sciousness in its attempt to explain itself. individual steps in Hegel’s dialectic are thus necessary in the 
same way in which the individual moves within a Platonic dialogue are necessary. i thus disagree with 
neuhouser, who states that, by showing desire to be a necessary condition of self-consciousness (insofar 
as desire serves as a condition of experiencing something as distinct from the subject), Hegel can be 
said to have “in a quite strong sense ‘deduced’ desire” (neuhouser, “Deducing Desire and Recognition 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit,” 251). neuhouser’s reading attributes to Hegel a method that is not as 
extreme as Fichte’s attempted construction of the concept of a drive, but still more rigorous than the 
Hegelian argumentative strategy i sketch here.
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of consciousness, what Hegel calls their “reflection into a unity” (¶189). By the 
end of ¶197 the lord has, of course, disappeared from the landscape since he has 
become superfluous; the bondsman contains within itself the “pure being-for-self” 
characteristic of the lord and becomes aware of this fact through the experience of 
its work. But we can think of this integration of subjects in at least two different ways. 
on the one hand, the laboring bondsman appears to develop a lord-like aspect 
internally as a result of its implicitly free commitment to serving the lord.57 this is 
how Hegel presents the situation in ¶¶195–96, where the bondsman is described 
as coming to see its own independence in the form of the object it produces for 
the lord. the thought here is that, in fashioning the object and regarding its real-
ity, the bondsman is implicitly aware of itself as a subject that has set itself this task 
in opposition to its natural desires. this implicit awareness of self is thus Hegel’s 
candidate for the experience of finding oneself as a subject.
on the other hand, we can also see the conclusion of this section as the result 
of the gradual education of the protagonist of the Phenomenology, the observed 
consciousness that has consistently been inclined to regard itself as a mere point 
of view on the world (¶91, ¶167). this self-understanding stands fast until our 
protagonist takes up the project of explaining “what consciousness knows in know-
ing itself” (¶165), that is, until desire appears on the scene as an essential element 
of this explanation, requiring consciousness to give up this self-understanding. 
Desire is now an integral part of its self-conception, as is a position within the social 
whole of spirit. Looking at matters in this way, we might say that the protagonist 
of the Phenomenology, previously defined by its “lordlike” tendencies, has come to 
recognize its opposing moment, the empirical, desiring self. thus a recognitive 
relation between lord and bondsman is realized between two elements of a single 
subject. the abstract “i” of ¶167 (which we might also think of as an “ideal” sub-
ject, a transcendental subject, a mere point of view on the world, etc.) has finally 
come to regard its concrete particular self (the desiring, “real,” empirical subject 
with a particular biological and historical constitution) as essential to it. And it is 
only through appeal to the concept of desire that we can explain why this lord-
like pole of the subject is right to acknowledge the moment corresponding to the 
bondsman.58 Without such a foundation for consciousness’s recognition of its 
57 We must view the bondsman’s situation as a result of a free commitment to serve, even though 
the bondsman finds itself in a state of servitude due to the actions of another subject. While the 
lord provides the threat in ¶194, it is the bondsman’s non-natural (that is, rational) response to this 
threat that gives rise to its predicament. in taking the effect of a recognized other to be the internal 
development of one’s freedom, Hegel is appropriating Fichte’s notion of a summons (Aufforderung), 
according to which a subject can determine another to be self-determining (Fichte, Natural Right, 31; 
SW 3:32–33).
58 in “the Apperceptive i,” John McDowell argues that this claim concerning the integration of 
two parts of a single subject is the primary meaning of the confrontation Hegel describes in “Lordship 
and Bondage.” While i agree with McDowell that “Self-Consciousness” aims at this end of integration 
(and have been influenced by him on this point), i believe that only by considering the lord also as 
a recognized other who serves as a constraint on desire satisfaction can we understand the reasons 
why the subject is integrated in this way. Furthermore, since McDowell advocates what i have called 
the contextual reading of Hegel’s concept of desire, he is unable to explain how this reconciliation 
between the two moments of consciousness takes place. A recognitive relation between two parties 
is always a normative relationship, one that stands in need of reasons, and insofar as the contextual 
reading of desire leaves us unable to explain why the abstract “i” ought to acknowledge the working,
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bodily self, Hegel’s transition from self-consciousness in general, in the opening 
paragraphs of “Self-Consciousness,” to a consideration of concrete social norms 
and possible relations to one’s body and desires, in “Stoicism, Skepticism, and 
the Unhappy Consciousness,” would appear as a mere assertion concerning the 
nature of consciousness—exactly the kind of transition that Hegel’s methodology 
forbids.59
Similarly, we might say that the aspect of consciousness corresponding to the 
merely desiring consciousness of ¶¶174–76 comes to see in the lord’s being-for-
itself a condition of its own being. By ¶196, the mere existence of a set of natural 
desires for a subject is revealed to have, as its condition, the ability to abstract 
from the demands of nature and determine itself in relation to a willed end 
and other actual or possible subjects. Since the self-determination of desire can 
be understood as the determination of a subject only from the point of view of 
agency—the bondsman’s standpoint of actively holding in check its natural desires 
for the sake of pursuing an end it has chosen—a set of desires by itself cannot be 
regarded as an instance of subjectivity in any form. the introduction of desire in 
a discussion of an animal’s consumption of an object should not, then, be seen 
as the beginning of a naturalistic account of self-consciousness. on the contrary, 
it serves only to foreshadow a step in the gradual development of consciousness’s 
self-understanding, within which desire always already plays a role in consciousness 
of oneself. Here again there is a clear Fichtean influence. After articulating the 
role played by a drive in the beginning of self-consciousness, Fichte asserts:
to be sure, i follow the dictates of the drive, but i do so with the thought that i could 
also have not followed them. only under this condition does the manifestation of my 
force become an instance of acting ; only under this condition is self-consciousness—
and consciousness in general—possible.60
Hegel and Fichte diverge in their accounts of the conditions of free self-determi-
nation in relation to desire or drive, with Hegel proposing only the barest recogni-
tion of another subject as sufficient for agency in contrast to Fichte’s view that a 
commitment to ethical action is necessary for any willing of an end.61 their views 
synthesizing empirical subject, McDowell’s innovative account of “Lordship and Bondage” fails to 
explain the emergence of a subject that has reconciled itself to having an empirical, embodied mo-
ment. i find this to be the main shortcoming of McDowell’s “heterodox” reading of “Lordship and 
Bondage” and the sections leading up to it. 
59 the first acknowledgement of a living “moment” of consciousness by a figure in the Phenom-
enology appears to be just such a mere assertion. in ¶189 Hegel describes the result of the fight to the 
death in ¶¶186–88 in the following terms: “in this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as 
essential to it as pure self-consciousness.” Since Hegel has almost nothing to say on the question of 
why one figure in this struggle backs down and accepts the role of bondsman, many commentators 
have wondered how Hegel means to explain this development. But if we understand “Lordship and 
Bondage” as a non-genetic account of the structure of self-conscious experience, the acceptance of 
this role and the associated fear of death are simply conditions under which desire can be understood 
as part of a self-conscious experience. An actual struggle to the death—the only possible result of a 
conflict between desiring subjects in a context lacking norms of conduct—plays no role in Hegel’s 
account of self-consciousness, so there is no need to explain how it might be resolved.
60 Fichte, System of Ethics, 104; SW 4:108.
61 this view on the status of ethical norms underlies Fichte’s attempt to improve on kant’s practi-
cal philosophy by providing a strict deduction of the moral law. if free agency and moral agency are 
one and the same, Fichte argues, the authority of the moral law has been established. See System of 
Ethics, 19–23; SW 4:14–18.
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on the reciprocal relation between desire and spontaneity are, however, quite 
similar. to put the point in Hegel’s preferred terminology, self-consciousness is 
in fact desire in general, but only because desire held in check by a commitment 
to serving another subject plays an essential role in the experience of finding 
oneself.62
thus, by the end of “Lordship and Bondage,” there does exist a relation of 
mutual recognition, even though no such relation between distinct, desiring 
subjects is achieved. each of the two poles of a single consciousness regards the 
other as essential to its being. Because this reciprocal recognition within the sub-
ject is conditioned by the existence of an interpersonal recognitive relation, the 
Fichtean interpretation of Hegel pursued here preserves the familiar Hegelian 
conclusion that self-consciousness is a social, intersubjective phenomenon. But the 
argument for this conclusion now appears in a very different light. interpersonal 
recognition serves as a condition of self-consciousness not because another subject 
somehow “mirrors” my subjectivity to me, but because freedom from the compul-
sion of desire requires seeing that the ends of another willing subject can serve as 
a constraint on my own desire satisfaction.63 Since it is the concept of desire that 
connects the “second moment” of consciousness in general with the conditions of 
free willing in ¶¶195–96, Hegel’s use of the concept perpetuates Fichte’s project 
of demonstrating “throughout the whole man that unity and connection which so 
many systems fail to provide.”64 
Viewing “Lordship and Bondage” in this way also sheds new light on Hegel’s 
introduction of the concept of desire in ¶167. there he asserts of self-conscious-
ness:
this antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, however, for its essence only the 
truth, viz. the unity of self-consciousness with itself; this unity [Einheit] must become 
essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is desire in general. (¶167)
the role played by the concept of desire in “Self-Consciousness” enables us to give 
a more precise sense to the unity mentioned in this passage. the first two sections 
of “Self-Consciousness” result in a self-understanding on the part of consciousness 
that commits it to regarding as essential the elements of its being that initially ap-
62 Viewing the identification of self-consciousness and desire in this manner may seem to yield 
an opaque structure for Hegel’s argument, since the remarks on desire in ¶¶167–68 would appear to 
be comprehensible only retrospectively. However, in writing the Phenomenology, Hegel most likely as-
sumed a familiarity with the Fichtean background of his argument. other allusions to Fichtean claims 
or concepts are never flagged as such, so it should not be surprising that this use of Fichte in ¶167 is 
not identified either. And while the identification of self-consciousness with desire can sound bizarre 
today, it would not have struck Hegel or his first readers as a remark in need of immediate explana-
tion. it would have shown up instead as an expression of Hegel’s commitment to demonstrating the 
fundamental unity of subjective capacities.
63 the question of what, precisely, serve as the conditions under which self-consciousness is 
possible—interaction with another actual subject, possession of the concept of another subject, etc.—is 
too broad to be considered in this context.
64 Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre, 259; SW 1:295. in light of the central role played by desire in Hegel’s 
account of the unity of the subject, one might even attribute to Hegel the Fichtean claim that the 
“i” is fundamentally a practical phenomenon, or as Fichte puts the point, that “the practical faculty 
is the innermost root of the i” (Fichte, Natural Right, 21; SW 3:21). However, i believe that Hegel’s 
point is better expressed through the claim that practical and theoretical capacities of the “i” are 
mutually-conditioning.
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peared inessential, such as its physical nature, its relation to other subjects, and 
even its location within a particular point in history.65 taking these elements to be 
essential to it commits the observed consciousness to thinking of itself as unified 
in a way that it did not at the beginning of “Consciousness,” where it first came on 
the scene as a mere “i.” therefore, just as the object of knowledge has developed 
and unfolded in the opening chapters of the Phenomenology, the subject has shown 
itself to be something much different from what it first took itself to be. 
this development should not be surprising, given the importance accorded 
to the reciprocal relation between consciousness’s concept of an object and its 
concept of itself within the notion of the experience of consciousness that provides 
the structure of the Phenomenology (¶¶86–88). And there is, again, a Fichtean prec-
edent for describing as a unit the elements of consciousness that we are tempted to 
regard as only contingently related. in a passage in the System of Ethics that Hegel 
himself finds significant,66 Fichte asserts:
[A]lthough a part of what pertains to me is supposed to be possible only through 
freedom, and another part of the same is supposed to be independent [unabhängig] 
of freedom, just as freedom is supposed to be independent of it, the substance to 
which both of these belong is simply one and the same, and is posited as one and 
the same. the i that feels and i that thinks, the i that is driven and i that makes a 
decision by means of its own free will: these are all the same.67
the claim that apparently independent aspects of consciousness stand in relations 
of interdependence might be regarded as the most general result of Hegel’s in-
vestigation into self-consciousness and desire in the Phenomenology. of course, in 
his transition to the historical development of freedom in “Stoicism, Skepticism, 
and the Unhappy Consciousness,” Hegel presents the observed consciousness as 
systematically misunderstanding these relations of interdependence in its various 
attempts to regard its living, desiring, earthly qualities as inessential. this return 
to a generally lordlike stance that privileges the freedom of thought in relation 
to desire within a context of actual bondage (¶199) is, however, nothing more 
than a misunderstanding of what stands fast for the phenomenological observer, 
namely the identity of the bondsman as object and the bondsman as conscious-
ness. As Hegel puts it, “for the subservient [dienenden] consciousness as such, 
these two moments—itself as an independent object, and this object as a mode of 
consciousness [dieses Gegenstandes als eines Bewußtseins], and hence its own essential 
nature—fall apart” (¶197). For us, however, this essential interrelation between 
practical and theoretical capacities of the subject established in “Lordship and 
Bondage” is to provide a framework within which such misunderstandings of the 
subject and its freedom can be unraveled.
65 of course much more needs to be said in order to establish that social and historical aspects of 
our experience are in play in “Lordship and Bondage.” Here i simply take for granted what i believe 
to be a reasonable understanding of one dimension of the Phenomenology.
66 Hegel discusses this passage, as well as his reasons for thinking that Fichte’s philosophy fails to 
establish this result, in his “Difference” essay. See Hegel, The Difference Between the Fichtean and Schell-
ingian Systems of Philosophy, trans. J.P. Surber (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1978), 
54; Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, ed. Rheinish-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner, 1969), 2:74.
67 Fichte, System of Ethics, 104; SW 4:108.
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this understanding of the overall intent of “Self-Consciousness” requires that 
we regard Hegel’s concerns here as much broader than they are commonly taken 
to be. However, in taking the unity of the subject to be Hegel’s primary concern, 
one is not committed to seeing the chapter as an aside of sorts, independent of 
Hegel’s investigation into our knowledge of objects. the Phenomenology might ap-
pear to accomplish very little on this point in its transition from “Consciousness” to 
“Reason,” since the “certainty of consciousness that it is all reality” (Hegel’s wildly 
Fichtean characterization of the thesis of idealism at the beginning of “Reason” 
[¶233]) is already implicit in the abandonment of a realist account of knowledge 
of objects at the end of “Consciousness.” But progress is made in coming to un-
derstand knowledge, and it is important to see how this progress depends upon 
the role of desire in the self-understanding of the observed consciousness.
in accounting for its relation to itself, consciousness finds that the awareness 
of bodily desires serves as a condition of any self-relation; as we have seen, this is 
the central result of “Self-Consciousness” upon which every other claim about self-
consciousness—that it is social or intersubjective—ultimately depends. in coming 
to recognize the significance of its bodily nature, the subject that previously took 
itself to be a mere point of view on the world acquires a different attitude toward 
the world itself. taking one’s bodily nature to be an essential part of conscious-
ness involves seeing everything inextricably connected with that bodily nature 
(such as the organic whole of a living environment, particular objects of desire, 
etc.) to be a non-accidental aspect of one’s worldview. thus the world of natural 
consciousness’s concern appears as essential to the point of view of the mere “i,” 
and the same objects that seemed, at the end of “Force and the Understanding,” 
to be nothing more than determinations of the subject are revealed to possess an 
independence of their own. this is just the result demanded by Hegel’s commit-
ment to viewing self-consciousness as “the reflection out of the being of the world 
of sense and perception” and “essentially the return from otherness [Anderssein]” 
(¶167).68
in light of the relation between self-consciousness and desire outlined above, 
we might say that it is a subject’s own bodily desires that constitute the “point of 
contact” between the two essential aspects of a subject, the simple, theoretical “i” 
and the embodied, social, historical agent acting within an objective world. once 
a subject that considers itself to be a mere point of view on the world comes to 
regard its own desires as essential to it, and with them a living environment, objects 
of desire, other subjects, and so on, it is committed to the objective reality and 
independence of the objects of its cognition. it is through desire that the physical 
world loses the form of mere appearance for the observed consciousness, becom-
ing something independent, real, and distinctively other. thus desire plays the 
central role in Hegel’s attempt to assuage our worry that, in admitting the essential 
68 McDowell sees important epistemological conclusions following from the relation Hegel 
establishes between the subject and its objects (including its empirical self) in “Lordship and Bond-
age.” in particular, he argues that it is only by understanding a subject as a stable synthesis of “lord” 
and “bondsman” that we see how absolute knowledge is possible (McDowell, “the Apperceptive i,” 
4, 11–12). i believe that the reading of “Self-Consciousness” that i offer here is at least compatible 
with McDowell’s claims.
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determination of all objects of consciousness by our capacities for cognition, we 
have lost the objective world and are left with mere appearance or illusion. While 
objects are in this sense subject-dependent, they retain their independence and 
reality through their relation to desire and its status as an integral aspect of subjec-
tivity.69 And if we want to identify some particular entity as that which is both mere 
appearance and independent thing (the two objects of consciousness in general in 
¶167), then it is surely the desire of a willing subject that fits the bill. While bodily 
desires show up for a willing subject as given determinations of its willing activity, 
in relation to the act of freely willing an end they are mere appearances, that is, 
possible reasons for action that derive their force only from the will.
thus for Hegel, the reality of the object of cognition described in the first 
three chapters of the Phenomenology is ultimately rooted in desire. in making this 
point, however, i do not mean to suggest that Hegel has adopted a version of the 
“Anstoß” account of objectivity Fichte proposes in the third part of the Wissen-
schaftslehre, according to which our experience of the “not-i” as something other 
than consciousness is at base practical, the experience of resistance to our own 
striving. While some commentators have suggested such a reading of Hegel on 
the basis of his remarks in “Self-Consciousness,” i see little evidence for this view 
in the text.70 in ¶175 Hegel does, admittedly, note that a desiring subject will 
inevitably regard itself as dependent upon its environment, which then appears 
to that subject as independent insofar as it simply offers satisfaction to desires or 
fails to do so. But Hegel never asserts that a subject’s experience of objectivity is a 
result of a desire’s satisfaction being dependent upon its object. instead, he uses 
this point to argue for the necessity of a different kind of constraint on a subject’s 
practical activity—namely the rational constraint afforded by a recognized willing 
subject—if that practical activity is to be the activity of a self-conscious subject. 
to be sure, Fichte himself regards his notions of check (Anstoß) and summons 
(Aufforderung) as parallel accounts of the basic constraint on a subject’s activity, 
but absent any independent reason to attribute the former notion to Hegel, we 
should not, i think, take him to be following Fichte in regarding the objectivity of 
experience as a practical phenomenon. this is especially so in light of the fact that, 
in the bondsman’s experience described in ¶196, it is the object of work, with its 
recognizable form, that confronts the bondsman—not some alien, characterless 
constraint on its practical activity.
69 More specifically, objects are independent, or transcendent, through their connection with 
subjective states that presuppose the basic capacity of desire, namely work (gehemmte Begierde) and fear 
in the face of death (Furcht des Todes). See ¶¶194–96. 
70 An example of this opposing view is found in neuhouser’s claim that “in order to posit the ‘i’ 
as an entity, self-consciousness must be aware of something which is ‘not-i’ that serves to delimit the 
thing being defined. Being aware of this otherness, however, is impossible on a merely cognitive level” 
(neuhouser, “Deducing Desire and Recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit,” 250). More recently, 
Allen Wood has argued that Fichte’s striving doctrine, and in particular the organic tendencies of 
the “i” outlined in Fichte’s resolution of the “antinomy” of the second chapter of the System of Ethics, 
ought to be viewed as “the activity through which the i posits the not-i” and that such a view “would 
justify Hegel’s association of self-consciousness with desire, and moreover with desire grounded in life-
processes of the self-conscious being as an animal being” (Allen Wood, “Fichtean themes in Hegel’s 
Dialectic of Recognition,” delivered at the APA Pacific Division meeting, March 2005).
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5 .  c o n c l u s i o n
i have argued that acknowledging Hegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s strategy for 
demonstrating unity within consciousness, and in particular his implicit appeal to 
the role played by the notion of a drive (Trieb) in Fichte’s account of the beginning 
of self-consciousness, is essential for understanding Hegel’s use of the concept 
of desire. Much more would need to be said about the role played by desire in 
“Lordship and Bondage” in order to substantiate the importance of this concept 
for Hegel’s views on self-consciousness. i have barely touched on Hegel’s under-
standing of the will and its constraint through the recognition of another subject, 
for example. But my goal here has only been to demonstrate that a reading of 
“Lordship and Bondage” should be oriented around the assumption that Hegel 
does intend to appeal to an awareness of one’s bodily desires in an account of the 
experience of finding oneself as a subject.
Viewing matters in this way does provide us with a principle to follow in read-
ing “Lordship and Bondage.” the central result of that section—the need for 
the bondsman’s desire to become work through being held in check—must be 
understood as an articulation of a condition under which the mere sentiment of 
desire can be regarded by us, the phenomenological observers, as a part of the 
bondsman’s experience of “finding itself willing” (to use Fichte’s phrase from the 
System of Ethics). Hegel’s detailed descriptions of the fear that underlies servitude, 
the end pursued by the bondsman, and the perceived reality of that end would then 
appear as a phenomenology of the context in which a self-conscious subject finds 
itself. this is not to deny that the notions of recognition and work are essential to 
Hegel’s account of normativity and the historical development of our common 
conceptual scheme. Such notions can, i think do double duty here, since we have 
seen that the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology is best viewed not simply as an 
account of the social institution of norms, but also as an attempt to remedy the 
self-understanding of the self-conscious, rational subjects who employ them.71
71 i owe thanks to Béatrice Longuenesse for invaluable comments on earlier versions of this mate-
rial. i have also benefited from conversations with Paul Franks, Fred neuhouser, David Sussman, and 
Günter Zöller, as well as from the comments of two anonymous referees for this journal.
